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THE LAW CONCERNING FOREIGN RECEIVERS
In the early administration of law in this country, the states
were regarded as foreign to each other in a sense much. stricter
than the prevailing one. The earlier conception of their relation-
ship was the natural outgrowth of their jealousy toward each
other and desire to maintain their autonomy. With the growth
of business interests a different conception has been developing,
which demands the application of similar rules for all without
much regard for state lines. Our national bankruptcy law is one
of the ripened fruits of a common country's experience. Before,
local creditors obtained undue advantage over outside creditors;
now, the advantage or conditions of all creditors are equalized.
The need of overlooking state lines to serve the higher end of
justice is clearly seen in administering the law of foreign re-
ceivers. In 1854, the Supreme Court of the United States decided
that a judicial receiver "has no extra territorial power of official
action; none which the court appointing him can confer, with
authority to enable him to go into a foreign jurisdiction to take
possession of the debtor's property; none which can give hiii,
upon the principle of conity, a privilege to stle in a foreign court
or another jurisdiction, as the judgment creditor himself might
have done, where his debtor may be answerable to the tribunal
which the creditor may seek."' To that rule the highest federal
court has always adhered. 2
Though a foreign receiver by the federal rule is denied au-
thority to act in a foreign jurisdiction, an auxiliary receiver may
be appointed who can act as effectively, perhaps more so, than
a foreign receiver could act if he were judicially recognized.
Consequently, he is often appointed by the federal courts. "It
is true," says Justice Day, "that the auxiliary receiverships are
generally conducted in harmony with the court of original juris-
diction, but such receivers are appointed with a view of vesting
control of property rights in the court in whose jurisdiction they
are located." '
I Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322, 338.
2Hale v. Allinson, i88 U. S. 56; Quincy, M. & P. R. Co. v. Huinph-
reys, 145 U. S. 82; Great Western Mining & Manufacturing Co. z,.
Harris, i98 U. S. 561; Fowler v. Osgood, 72 C. C. A. 276, 141 Fed. 20
3 Great Western Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Harris, i98 U. S.
56I, 577; Fowler v. Osgood, 141 Fed. 20.
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The lower federal tribuials, on most occasions, have loyally
followed the rule of the higher court. Again and again have the
petitions of foreign receivers been denied. Onl most of these
occasions, the denial has been founded on the superior rights of
local creditors which, even admitting the rule of comity, are still
everywhere recognized and enforced.4  Yet on some occasions
the lower federal courts have applied the rule of comity, notwith-
standing the deliverance in Booth v. Clark. Thus, in Rogers v.
Riley 5 the court, while maintaining the general rule that a re-
ceiver has no extra-territorial jurisdiction, held that it is limited
by the exception arising out of comity, that whenever a receiver
is appointed to collect the assets, pay the debts and wind up the
affairs of a corporation, he may sue for that purpose in another
jurisdiction, provided his bill shows that all the corporate debts
have been paid, so that there are no domestic creditors requiring
protection, and that there will be no infringement of the public
policy of the state. The court seemingly acted on the belief or
knowledge that "the rule of comity is not applied with the same
strictness with which it is declared :" O in other words. while
4Zacher v. Fidelity Trust and Safety Vault Co., 45 C. C. A. 480;
Edwards v. National Window Glass Jobbers' Association, 139 Fed. 795;
Hazard v. Durant, i9 Fed. 471; Brigham v. Luddington. 12 Blatchf. 237,
242; Olney v. Tanner, 21 Blatchf. 540, affg. xo Fed. ioi; Wilkinson v.
Culver, 23 Blatchf. 416- Chandler v. Boston Safe Deposit Co.. 72 Fed.
700, 7oi; Sands v. Greeley, 88 Fed. 130, 45 C. C. A. 480; Hilliker v. Hale,
54 C. C. A. 252, 117 Fed. 220, 225, citing many cases; Holnes v. Sher-
wood, 3 McCrary, 405. Contras Tully v. Herron, 44 Miss. 626, citing
Kirkland v. Lowe, 33 Miss. 436; Farmers' and Merchants' Insurance Co.
v. Needles, 52 Mo. i; Moseby v. Burrow, 52 Tex. 396 (iSSo).
In Lewis v. American Naval Stores' Co., ii9 Fed. 391, 396, Selby, Cir.
J. said: "The modern practice is to permit [the receiver] to bring suits
on the ground of comity in all cases where such permission will not
conflict with the rights of citizens or creditors in the state where the
suit is brought. And the constant tendency of the courts is toward a
more enlarged and liberal policy.-the recognition of the receiver's right
to the possession of the property embraced by the decree appointing him,
although situated without the jurisdiction of the court making the ap-
pointment. This tendency is so pronounced, and so well sustained by
authority, that it is probable that the doctrine ultimately to be established
will give to receivers the same right of action in all the states of the
Union with which they are invested in the jurisdiction in which they are
appointed."
r1 80 Fed. 759; Lewis v. Clark, 129 Fed. 570; Lewis v. American Naval
Stores Co., ii9 Fed. 391.
G Macfarlane, J., Robertson v. Staed, 135 Mo. 135, 138.
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saying to foreign chancery receivers that federal practice forbids
the granting of their applications on the ground of comity, never-
theless, they will be granted in some cases, and it may be that
favorable action is more frequent than is disclosed in the pub-
lished reports.
7
It is true that the lower federal courts have sometimes re-
marked that a foreign receiver cannot sue in a court of another
jurisdiction exrcept by cornity of the court whose assistance he
invokes," but have safely landed by denying the receiver's ap-
plication for other reasons than lack of comity. Nor is the re-
ceivers application strengthened by obtaining leave of the court
to bring his application; its final action is in no way narrowed by
granting this preliminary request for it was "meaningless." 10
While denying to recognize foreign chancery receivers, the
federal courts have never hesitated to apply a different rule to
receivers who derived their authority from statute. In a recent
case, Booth v. Clark and its successors were invoked- as prece-
dents against permitting a corporation receiver appointed in New
York to sue a stockholder who lived in Minnesota. But the
court, speaking through Justice Day, declared that those cases
"held that a chancery receiver, having no other authority than
that which would arise from his appointment as such, could not
maintain an action in another jurisdiction. In this case, the
statute confers the right upon the receiver, as a quasi assignee,
7 Lewis v. Clark, 64 C. C. A. 138. 129 Fed. 570. In Chandler v. Siddle,
3 Dill. 477, 479. Judge Miller said: "It is, perhaps. true, that where duly
appointed and authorized, a receiver may ordinarily sue in another state.
This power, when it exists, arises from comity in the absence of special
statute regulations, and it is in general. subordinate to the rights of local
creditors as respects property within the jurisdiction where such a suit
is brought.
"Outside of the jurisdiction which appoints him. a receiver is not
ordinarily entitled to maintain suits except by comity; and this comity does
not extend to aiding preferences sought to be acquired by statutory assign-
ments'or other proceedings in invitunt. to the detriment of other creditors
whose interests are in the keeping of foreign or independent tribunals!'
Brown, Dist. J., Olney v. Tanner. io Fed. Ior, IO4. citing Booth v. Clark,
17 How. 322; Brigham v. Luddington. 12 Blatch. 237. 242; Chandler v.
Siddle, 3 Dill. 477 Willits V. [Vaite, 25 N. Y. 577, 587; Hoyt v. Thoinp-
son, 5 N. Y. 320; Runk v. St. John. 29 Barb. 585; Batton v. Valentine. i
Curt. i68: Hope Mutual Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 2 Robt. 274. 284.
8 ZacheC- v. Fidelity Trust and Safety Vault Co.. To6 Fed. 593. 595.
9 See cases under Note 4.
10 Fowaler v. Osgood, 72 C. C. A. 276.
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and representative of the creditors, and, as such, vested with the
authority to maintain an action. In such cases, we think the re-
ceiver may sue in a foreign jurisdiction." 1
Why should the United States Supreme Court be so ready to
extend the rule of comity to a statutory receiver while denying
so uniformly the rule to a judicial receiver? Are the powers of
the two so unlike as to justify this great difference in treatment?
It is said that the title to the property entrusted to a statutory
receiver is vested in him, while the control over property ex-
ercised by a chancery receiver is limited by the appointing power.
Yet the practical distinction between the authority of the two
kinds has often been shadowy so far as disclosed in the history
of the cases.
The federal remedy of appointing an auxiliary receiver, in-
stead of permitting the foreign receiver to act, is strongly dis-
countenanced by the highest court in New York whenever the
foreign receiver can act, because his authority is declared to be
more effective and his service less expensive. Says Justice Vann,
in describing the authority of a foreign receiver: "Subject to
the superior rights of domestic creditors, the plaintiff can reduce
to possession all the property of the defendant in this state, and
can bring replevin for that purpose, or trover to recover damages
for conversion. Notes and accounts may be collected by the
usual proceedings in our courts, which regard a foreign receiver
as representing the original owner, and open their doors to him
as they do to a domestic receiver."12 On the occasion of this de-
liverance, as a foreign receiver possessed such ample authority,
his application for the appointment of an auxiliary receiver was
denied."
Turning to the state courts, a striking change in practice is
everywhere seen. While maintaining the doctrine as firmly as
the federal courts, that receivers have no legal rights beyond the
states of their origin, in exercising comity the distinction between
judicial and statutory -receivers is practically ignored. The rule
that prevails almost everywhere is thus stated by Chief Justice
Beasley: "When there are no persons interested but the litigants
in a foreign jurisdiction, and it becomes expedient in the progress
of such suit that the.property of one of them, wherever it may be
x1 Bernheimer v. Converse, 2o6 U. S. 516, 534: Relfe v. Rundle, 1O3
J. S. 222, 226; Avery v. Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 72 Fed. 700.
12 Mabon v. Ongley Electric Co.. 156 N. Y. 196. 201.
13 Ibid.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
situated, should be brought in and subjected to such proceeding,
I can think of no objection against allowing such power to be
exercised. It could not be exercised in a foreign jurisdiction to
the disadvantage of creditors resident there, because it is the
policy of every government to retain in its own" hands the
property of a debtor until all domestic claims against it have been
satisfied. But beyond this precaution, why should any restraint
be put upon the foreign procedure?" 1,
The courts, however, still maintain with nearly all their for-
mer vigor the superior rights of their own creditors, and their
duty to uphold and defend their creditors' interests. Accordingly,
while permitting a foreign receiver to sue, he cannot take away
any of the property if needed to discharge the claims of home
creditors. "' Thus, when the property of a foreign debtor has
been garnisheed by a home creditor, the courts of his state will
protect him in holding it against a foreign receiver who wishes to
take it away.'6 Whenever, therefore, be is permitted .to sue, he
must submit to the limitations imposed by the foreign juris-
diction.17 He can enforce his claim to the property of a non-
resident debtor in his state only so far and in such a manner as
the policy of the state permits. 8  Nevertheless, persons who sub-
scribe for stock in a building and loan association are not en-
titled, should it dissolve, to retain its assets in the state where
they live until all the claims are satisfied. 19
'4 Hurd v. City of Elizabeth, 41 N. J. Law, I, 3; Bidlack v. Mason.
26 N. J. Equity, 230; Sobernheimer v. Wheeler, 45 N. J. Eq. 614; Winans
v. Gibbs & Starrett Mfg. Co.. 48 Kan. 777; Boulware v. Davis, go Ala. 207;
Metzner v. Bauer, 98 Ind. 427; Catlin v. Wilcox Silver Plate Co., 123 Ind.
477, 479; Pond v. Cooke, 45 Conn. 126; Hunt v. Columbian Insurance Co.,
55 Me. 297, 298; Runk v. St. John, 29 Barb. 585; Petersen v. Chemical
Bank, 32 N. Y. I, 43; Mabon v. Ongley Electric Co., 156 N. Y. 196, 2oi,
and cases cited; Graydon v. Church, 7 Mich. 36; Comstock v. Frederick-
son, 51 Minn. 350; Sercomb v. Collin, 128 Ill. 556; Swing v. Bentley &
Gerwig Furniture Co., 45 W. Va. 283; Bagby v. Atlantic, Miss. & Ohio
R., 86 Pa. 291; Cogill v. Woolridge, 8 Bax. 58o; Merchants' National
Bank v. McLeod. 38 Ohio St. 174; Hoyt v. Thompson, 5 N. Y. 320; S. C.
T9 N. Y. 207; Willits v. Waite, 25 N. Y. 577, 584; Protection and Lombard
Bank v. Thorp, 6 Cow. 46.
"5 Humphreys v. Hopkins, 8r Cal. 551; Lackimann v. Supreme Council
of Order of Chosen Friends, 142 Cal. 22; Catlin v. Wilcox Silver Plate
Co., 123 Ind. 477.
16 Ward v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.. 135 Cal. 235.
17 Zacher v. Fidelity Trust and Safety Vault Co., io6 Fed. 593, 595.
18 Ibid.
'9 Weedon v. Granite State Provident Association. T09 Ky. 504; Smitlr
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With respect to real estate, "an order appointing a receiver
of realty has no extra-territorial operation, and cannot affect the
title to real property which is located beyond the jurisdiction of
the court by which the order was made." 20 Consequently, the
home court cannot make certificates, issued by a receiver in
obedience to its order, a lien on real estate beyond its juris-
diction.21  Still less authority has he to maintain an action in the
state of his appointment to contest the title of purchasers under
execution to real property in the state where it is situated.2 2 And
doubtless the rule is without qualification that home creditors may
hold the land of their foreign debtor by attachment or other
proper proceeding against a foreign receiver, though perhaps not
a foreign creditor.23  But a foreign receiver may foreclose a
mortgage held by his debtor in another state, or enforce the
right of redemption thereto.24 And a foreign receiver may sue
on a bond and mortgage transferred by the court to him as suc-
cessor of another receiver to whom the obligation was executed.2 5
With respect to partnership property, a foreign receiver may
take charge of it, but, as this is a mere substitution of parties,
the receiver has no greater rights in such property than had the
partners themselves .2  He can indeed maintain an action for the
benefit of a defrauded partner to set aside the fraudulent sale of
partnership property effected by the other.2 7  But he cannot re-
move the funds of the partnership out of the state to the detri-
ment of resident creditors.2 8
v. Taggart, 30 C. C. A. 363, 87 Fed. 94; Maynard v. Granite State Provi-
dent Association, 34 C. C. A. 438, 92 Fed. 435; Irwin v. Granite State
Provident Association, 56 N. J. Eq. 244.
2 0 Schindelholz v. Cullum, 55 Fed. 885, 889.
21 Pool v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 7 Tex. Civ. App. 334.
22 Simpkins v. Smith and Parmelee Gold Co., 50 How. Pr. 56.
2 3 Moseby v. Burrow, 52 Tex. 396.
24 Graydon v. Church, 7 Mich. 36; Weller v. I. B. Pace Tobacco
Co., 2 N. Y. Supp. 292; Lewis v. Clark, 64 C. C. A. 138, 129 Fed. 570;
Boulware v. Davis, 9o Ala. 270. In the Graydon Case, the court remarked
that the receiver did not sue strictly in his official character, but as an
assignee holding the legal interest in the property by virtue of the debtor's
assignment.
25 Iglehart v. Bierce, 36 Ill. 133.
28 Ogden v. Warren, 36 Neb. 7M5.
27 Sobernheimer v. Wheeler, 45 N. J. Eq. 614.
28 Grogan v. Egbert, 44 W. Va. 75. See Sobernheimer v. Wheeler, 45
N. J. Eq. 614. Nor will the removal be permitted as against the bona tide
claims of the separate creditors of the members of the firm, unless he
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Even the superior rights of a foreign creditor who has property
of his debtor within his jurisdiction will prevail where the title
of the foreign assignor or receiver is acquired by virtue of a
voluntary conveyance or transfer. In such cases, says Justtice
Vann, his title "is sustained against all, even including domestic
creditors." 29 And the same rule has recently been declared in
New Hadiipshire.30 But this rule is limited to voluntary transfers
and does not cover those made by act of law.3 1
The reason for this distinction between voluntary and involun-
tary transfers, says Chief Justice Fuller, "is that a voluntary
transfer, if valid where made, ought generally to be valid every-
where, being the exercise of the personal right of the owner to
dispose of his own, while an assignment by operation of law has
no legal operation out of the state in which the law was passed." 32
But an assignment which, though voluntarily made, works a dis-
tribution of the assignor's effects by statute is not a voluntary
conveyance in the sense above described.33 Says Chief Justice
Andrews: "The right of an insolvent or bankrupt to initiate
voluntary proceedings in bankruptcy is a common feature in
bankrupt laws, but that fact does not make the assignment volun-
tary,, so as to give extra-territorial operation to the proceed-
ings." 3' For the same reason, the acceptance by a corporation
of a bank charter whereby, if becoming insolvent, all its property
is to vest forthwith in a receiver and be distributed by him in a
prescribed manner, does not give to the transfer thus effected the
character of a voluntary conveyance.3 5
Again, if a receiver has acquired title to the property en-
trusted to him in the state of his appointment, his title thereto is
first shows that the firm is insolvent and that the funds are necessary to
satisfy the demands against it. Grogan Case, 44 W. Va. 75.
2
"Mabon z, Ongley Electric Co., 156 N. Y. 196, 2Ol. See Willits v.
Waite, 25 N. Y. 577, 584; Edmunds v. National Window Glass Jobbers'
Association, 139 Fed. 795.
" Roberts v. Norcross, 69 N. H. 533.
31 Ibid: Carbee v. Mason, 64 N. H. io.
32 Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, i29: Roberts v. Norcross, 69
N. H. 533, 535, citing Barnett v. Kinney, 147 U. S. 476, 481; Frank v.
Bobbitt, 155 Mass. 112; Sawyer v. Levy, 162 Mass. i9o.
33 Zipcey v. Thompson, 67 Mass. 243; Pierce v. O'Brien, 129 Mass.
314; Johnson v. Parker, 4 Bush (Ky.) 149; Barth v. Backus, 14o N. Y.
230; Upton v. Hubbard, 1R Conn. aGD.
34 Barth v. Baekus. 14o N. Y. 230. See Security Trust Co. 'n Dodd,
Mead & Co., 173 U. S. 624.
3, Willits v. Waite. 25 N. Y. 577.
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not lost by sending it into another state."' A creditor living there
cannot take it from the receiver of an insolvent's estate to dis-
charge the insolvent's indebtedness. The courts everywhere, it
is believed, respect and preserve the receiver's title to his property
held under these conditions. Much stronger is the reason for the
rule if the property thus transported by the receiver in fulfillment
of a contract, for example, has been purchased with other means
belonging to the insolvent's estate.37 Still stronger is the reason
for permitting a receiver to recover property which has been
fraudulently or feloniously received from the jurisdiction of his
appointment into another state,38 or to recover property which
he has sent into another state to be sold.3 9
Will a foreign receiver be permitted to recover the property
belonging to his assignor as against a creditor who may appear
from the state where the debtor lived or from some other state?
Of course, a creditor living in the foreign state would, by all the
authorities, have a clear preference to the property, but the
courts have divided on the other question. Strong authorities
may be ranged on either side. Those who favor the foreign
creditor regard his rights to the property of the foreign debtor
much in the same way as they regard the rights of a home
creditor thereto in all attachment proceedings. Says the New
York Court of Appeals: "Once properly in court and accepted
as a suitor, neither the law, nor court administering the law, will
admit any distinction between the citizen of its own state and
that of another. Before the law and in its tribunals, there can be
no preference of one over the other."'4
36 Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. Keokuk Northern Line
Packet Co., 1o8 Ill. 317; Robertson v. Staed, 135 Mo. 135; Merchants'
National Bank v. Pennsylvania Steel Co., 57 N. J. Law, 336; Woodhull v.
Farmers' Trust Co., ii N. Dak. 157; Merchants' National Bank v. Mc-
Leod, 38 Ohio St. 174; Cagill v. Woolridgc, 8 Bax. 212; Upton v. Hubbard,
28 Conn. 274. Contra: Humphreys v. Hopkins, 81 Cal. 557.
"
7Pond v. Cooke, 45 Conn. 126.
38 McAlpin v. Jones, io La. Assn. 552.
39 Cagill v. Woolridgc, 8 Bax. 58o.
40 Hibernia National Bank v. Lacombe, 84 N. Y. 367, 385; Warner v.
Jaifray, 96 N. Y. 248; Rhawn v. Pierce, IO, Ill. 350; Paine v. Lester, 44
Conn. I96; Catlin v. Wilcox Silver Plate Co., 123 Ind. 477; Linville v.
Hadden, 88 Md. 594; Manhattan Co. v. Maryland Steel Co., 31 Western
Law Bull. Ioo; Boston Iron Co. v. Boston Locomotive Works, 51 Me. 585;
Lichtenstein -v. Gillett, 37 La. Ann. 522; Sands v. Greeley, 88 Fed. 130.
The states which favor the receiver are: Gilman v. Ketcham. 84 Vis. 6o;
Bagby v. Atlantic, Miss. & Ohio R., 86 Pa. 291; Long v. Girdwaod, i5o
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By putting foreign creditors who invoke the aid of foreign
courts on the plane with home creditors, the barrier for a long
way is torn down that formerly protected home creditors from
outsiders. But since foreign creditors who seek the aid of foreign
courts are in some jurisdictions thus favored, why should they be
singled out from all the creditors who are represented by a trus-
tee, assignee or receiver? Is the fact that they pursue such a
remedy themselves and'at their own expense, instead of per-
mitting the receiver to act for them in common with all other
foreign and home creditors, a sufficient reason? The impor-
tance, however, of this right to foreign creditors, wherever it
exists, has been greatly lessened since the enactment of the
national bankruptcy law.
Before bringing his suit, a foreign receiver, like any other,
must obtain permission from the court whose assistance is de-
sired. 4" And when granted he cannot sue in his own name on a
claim of the corporation, unless he is actually or virtually an
assignee of the claim he seeks to enforce. Therefore, in such an
action, if the answer is a general denial, the burden is on the
plaintiff to show that he is a receiver authorized to bring an
action in the foreign courts in his own name, and, in order to
recover, must prove that the defendant is liable to him as re-
ceiver in the present form of action.' 2
Pa. 413; Robertson v. Staed, 135 Mo. 135; Weil v. Bank of Burr Oak, 76
Mo. App. 547, 27 L. R. A. 324; Sercomb v. Catlin, 128 Ill. 556; Merchants'
National Bank v. Pennsylvania Steel Co., 57 N. J. Law, 336; Bentley v.
Whittimore, 4 C. E. Green, 462, 469; Thurston v. Rosenfeld, 42 Mo. 474.
41 See Kronberg v. Elder, 18 Kan. i5o, and Fowler v. Osgood, 72 C.
C. A. 276. In Avery v. Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 72 Fed. 700,
7o, Putnam, Cir. J. said: "No one can maintain a suit at common law
for this indebtedness unless the plaintiff can do it. He is styled a receiver,
but he is in substance a trustee, appointed by the statutes and the courts
to collect and distribute the assets of the corporation, and vested with the
title to them. He is the successor of the corporation, so far as the statutes
and the courts can make him such. If he were a mere receiver, in the
ordinary sense of the word, the corporation would survive and he could
sue in a common law court only in its name. This distinction must be
kept in view, and was elaborately expounded in Booth v. Clark, 17
How. 322. The plaintiff resembles, in some respects, a new corporation
into which an old one has been merged. In Relfe v. Rundle, lo3 U. S.
222, 225, a receiver of the same character was described as the successor
of the corporation, and it was there said that he was the corporation
itself, for all the purposes of winding up its affairs."
42 Homer v. Barr Pumping Engine Co., i8o Mass. 163, citing Amy v.
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If a stockholder is liable for a portion of his unpaid subscrip-
tion after the failure of the corporation, the receiver is permitted
in almost every state in the Union to receive either the entire
balance, or the amount needful to pay the corporation's indebted-
ness.13 Only in two or three states, perhaps, does the old doc-
trine survive, that comity will not permit a foreign receiver t
sue for an unpaid subscription." Even in these the stockholder
cannot escape, for a bill in equity will lie against him brought
by a creditor for the benefit of all the creditors.'
5
A severe battle has been waged to establish the authority of a
foreign receiver to recover the "double liability," thus generally
called, of a shareholder, that is, his liability for a sum in addi-
tion to the sum subscribed, if needed to pay the indebtedness of
the corporation whenever it passes into insolvency. Three rules
have been applied in different jurisdictions to those who have
sought to recover this contingent fund:
(i) The first and leading view is that the receiver can en-
force this liability, with some limitations that will be hereafter
considered. Some jurisdictions withhold permission for the rea-
son that, as the sum recoverable is an asset for the direct benefit
of the creditors, they only can enforce the remedy. Such juris-
dictions readily permit a receiver to sue for unpaid subscriptions,
because these are due directly to the corporation he represents.
The reason for the distinction is easily seen, but the hollowness
of the reason is becoming more and more manifest. While a
corporation is a going concern, the creditors have no lien on its
stockholders even for their unpaid subscriptions; their sole debtor
is the corporation itself; but when a corporation fails, then its
entire capital is transformed into a fund for the benefit of its
creditors on which they can rely for payment.4" The unpaid
Manning, 149 Mass. 487; Wilson v. Welch, 157 Mass. 77; Buswell v. Order
of the Iron Hall, x6i Mass. 224; Fort Payne Coal & Iron Co. v. Webster,
x63 Mass. 134; Ewing v. King, 175 Mass. 570; Hayward v. Leeson, I76
Mass. 325.
43 Stoddard v. Lurn, 159 N. Y. 265; Dayton v. Borst, 31 N. Y. 435;
Fish v. Smith, 73 Conn. 377; Mann v. Cooke, 20 Conn. 178; Castleman v.
Templeman, 87 Md. 586; Otter Vicw Land Co. v. Bolling, 70 S. W. (Ky.)
8.34; Wyman v. Bowman, 127 Fed. 257.
" Wyman v. Eaton, io7 Ia. 214; Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald Construction
Co., 41 Neb. 374, 407; Reed v. Burg, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 117.
45 Reed v. Burg, 2 Neb. (Un. of.) 117.
41 See the often-quoted statement of Justice Brewer in Iollizs v.
Brierficid Coal & Iron Co., 150 U. S. 371, 383, 385.
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capital, therefore, of a corporation before its failure, is not a
fund directly belonging to the creditors; only after failure
does such a fund become available to them to discharge their in-
debtedness. As the sum received from both sources, for unpaid
stock and the additional liability comes from the same persons
and is paid the same creditors, there is no good reason why the
receiver should not be permitted to sue for it in the one case as
well as in the other. And this view is rapidly growing; the sub-
stance of things is driving out the shadow. 7 ,
If this be the newer and better sustained view, two other views
must be mentioned for their force is not yet spent. One is, this
liability is a direct asset for the creditors, therefore they must all
unite in an equitable suit for their common benefit; or one or
more for the benefit of all. This view still prevails in several
states.
48
The third view is that a single creditor can sue a single stock-
holder, if he likes, to recover the sum due him from the failed
institution after he has established his claim against it by suit and
judgment.4 9  If the single stockholder is required to pay it, he,
47 Wilson v. Booth, 13 Wash. 676; Watterson v. Masterson, 15 Wash.
5I; Childs v. Cleaves, 95 Me. 498; Hale v. Cushman, 96 Me. 148; Lani-
gan v. North, 69 Ark. 62; Howarth v. Lombard, 175 Mass. 570; King v.
Vinal, 175 Mass. 580; Broadway National Bank v. Baker, 176 Mass. 294;
Hancock National Bank v. Ellis, 172 Mass. 39; Love v. Pusey, 3 Penn.
(Del.) 577; Cushing v. Perot, i75 Pa. 66; Howarth v. Angle, 162 N. Y.
179; King v. Cochran, 72 Vt. 107; Kirtley v. Holmes, 1o7 Fed. 747; Sheofe
v. Larimer, 79 Fed. 921 and cases cited; Cuykendall v. Miles, io Fed. 342.
See Castletnan v. Templeman, 87 Md. 546, and Whitman v. Oxford
National Bank, 176 U. S. 559. In Wigton v. Bosler, 102 Fed. 70, a receiver
of an Iowa bank was not permitted to sue a stockholder in Pennsylvania
as an act of comity. It might have been shown that, at that time in Iowa,
a stockholder was liable only by suit of the creditors. See Wyman v.
Eastern, 1o7 Ia. 214.
48 Western National Bank v. Lawrence, 117 Mich. 66g. 673; Guerney
v. Moore, 131 Mo. 6so; Pfaff v. Gruen, 92 Mo. App. 56o, containing an
elaborate review of cases; Morris v. Glenn, 87 Ala. 628; Ferguson v.
Sherman, ii6 Cal. i69; Abbott v. Goodall, ioo Me. 231; Bell v. Far-
well, 176 Ill. 489; First National Bank v. Gustin Mining Co., 42 Minn.
327; Woodworth v. Bowles, 61 Kan. 569, 582; Rhodes v. United States
National Bixnk 66 Fed. 512; McVickar v. Jones, 70 Fed. 574; Bank of
North America v. Rindge, 57 Fed. 279; State National Bank v. Sayward,
97 Fed. 443; Relfe v. Rundle, 1O3 U. S. 222; Flash v. Conn., Iog U. S.
371;Huntington v. Atrill, 146 U. S. 657; Whitman v. Oxford National
Bank, 176 U. S. 559.49 Ferguson v. Sherman, ii6 Cal. i69; Pulsifer v. Greene, 96 Me. 438;
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in turn, can sue his co-stockholders for their just contributions."
The second and third view is opposed to the view first mentioned
on the ground that the liability "is created directly to the credit-
ors and cannot be enforced by receivers in their own names or in
the name of the corporation." 51
There are cogent reasons for not adopting this third view.
The foreign stockholder, wherever this remedy exists, may be re-
quired to pay more than the home stockholder. "Nothing," re-
marks the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, "could be more un-
just than to permit a creditor or a number of creditors to re-
cover from a foreign stockholder to the full amount of his
liability, when other stockholders residing in the home state
were only required to contribute a less proportion of the value of
their stock." 52 To throw on a stockholder who has thus paid
more than his fair share toward discharging the indebtedness of
the insolvent corporation the trouble and expense of suing his
associates for contributions, is a great hardship.
By permitting the receiver to sue, all danger of unequal assess-
mtnts or demands of stockholders is avoided and the procedure
is reduced to the lowest terms and figures. Says Mr. Justice
Mitchell: "A receiver represents not only the corporation but all
its creditors, and as to the latter, it is his duty to secure all the
assets available for their payment. For this purpose, he succeeds
to their rights and has all the powers to enforce such rights that
Guerney v. Moore, 131 Mo. 65o; Lanigan v. North, 69 Ark. 62, 65; Han-
cock National Bank v. Ellis, 166 Mass. 414; Bank of North America v.
Rindge, 57 Fed. 279; Mechanics' Savings Bank v. Fidelity Trust and Safe
Deposit Co., 87 Fed 113.
5o See Hancock National Bank v. Ellis, 172 Mass. 39, 48.
5' Hancock National Bank v. Ellis, 172 Mass. 39, 49, citing Ibid; 166
Mass. 414, 479; National Bank of Barre v. Hingham Manufacturing Co.,
127 Mass. 563, 567; Chamberlin v. Hugenot Manufacturing Co., 118 Mass.
532.
52 Miller v. Smith, 26 R. 1. 146, 151. In answer to this, Powers, J., speak-
ing for the Supreme Court of Maine in the case of a stockholder in a
Kansas bank, who had been sued in Maine by a foreign creditor, said:
"The defendant has the same right to enforce contribution as he would
have if he resided in Kansas. It is the remedy which he accepted, when,
for purposes of gain he voluntarily accepted his stock, knowing that the
law placed upon him, and not upon the creditor, the burden of enforcing
contribution among the stockholders. He is simply held to the contribu-
tion which he made, and by which he agreed with the corporation creditor
to become responsible to him, severally and individually, and not jointly-
or ratably." Pulsifer v. Greene, 96 Me. 438, 474.
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the creditors before his appointment had in their own behalf,
even though such powers be beyond those which he has as the
representative of the corporation alone. As each creditor may
sue, the right is equal in all, and common to all, and hence the
receiver who represents all alike is the proper party to assert the
common right and pursue the common remedy, for the common
benefit. In this manner the rights of all will be protected and
justice be done in a single proceeding in which everyone will get
what is his due, no one will be called upon to pay more than his
fair proportion, and the expense, delay, inconvenience and in-
evitable occasional injustice of separate actions by different
creditors against different stockholders, with their attendant
legion of resulting actions for contribution will be avoided." 13
This is the practice under the national banking law, and its
efficiency and economy are so manifest that no opposing criticism
is ever heard. The federal courts, too, do not hesitate to recognize
foreign receivers in such cases, because their authority is founded
on statute and their recognition does not in any way conflict with
the practice of federal tribunals with respect to chancery re-
ceivers. Of course, a foreign receiver cannot maintain his suit if
there be any doubt concerning the validity of the assignment or
power from which he derives his authority;5 or if the amount of
the deficit required of stockholders has not been determined by a
court of proper authority.55
Since, however, receivers both at home and abroad proceed
against stockholders only after the amount of their liability has
been transformed into assessments against them, courts are show-
ing an increasing inclination to regard the proceedings establish-
ing the liability of stockholders as less conclusive than formerly.
Always, the judgment forming the basis of this liability has been
impeachable for fraud; now, the judgment forming the basis of
action against stockholders can be attacked for mistake,"5 for
lack of jurisdiction, 7 and in some states58 for non-notification
53 Cushing v. Perot, 175 Pa. 66; Bates v. Day, 198 Pa. 513, overruling
in effect. Aultman's Appeal, 98 Pa. 5oS.
64 Connor v. Omaha National Bank, 42 Neb. 6o2.
5SMcLaughlin v. O'Neill, 7 Wy. 187 and 215; Clark v. Knowles, 187
Mass. 35; Wigton v. Bosler, io2 Fed. 7o.
"Merchants' Bank v. Chandler, 19 Wis 434.
57 Ball v. Reese, 58 Kan. 614;. Fogg v. Ellis, 61 Neb. 859. Scherts v.
First National Bank, 47 111. App. 124; American National Bank v. Supplee,
rs Fed. 657.
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of foreign stockholders of the action in which judgment was
obtained against their corporations. On the one hand, while courts
are more disposed to permit foreign receivers to sue non-resident
stockholders for their liability, onthe other hand, courts are more
and more disposed to regard the preliminary proceedings as
possessing only a prima facie instead of a conclusive character,
thus protecting them fully in the end from unjust judgments and
excessive payments.
Two other important principles are also applied in all proceed-
ings by foreign receivers. No state will permit a foreign receiver
to sue within its jurisdiction who derives his authority from the
court or statute of another state that withholds similar authority
to foreign receivers. The permission is based on comity, and is
given only where comity prevails. 59
The other principle is, a foreign receiver may pursue a foreign
stockholder in his own state provided such action be not contrary
to its policy. Indeed, in some states, the double liability may be
enforced by comity against its citizens even though this principle
has not been adopted and applied to them as members of their
own home corporations. " Nor is there anything unreasonable or
illogical in this extension of the doctrine. For, we should re-
member, the liability rests on a contract into which a stockholder
voluntarily enters, and from which he derives solid advantages.
If such a contract were forbidden by the state in which the
foreign stockholder lives, then indeed the courts in that state
might with good reason decline to enforce it. But the mere fact
that such a contract is not made and therefore does not exist, in
a foreign state, is no proof that it is unlawful and ought not to
be enforced. Doubtless, there are contracts made in every state
that are peculiar, growing out of local customs, methods, and
kinds of business which are enforced in other jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, as most of the states have adopted and applied the
principle of double liability to the members of some or many of
the corporations they have created, and the worth of the principle
58 Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Funk, 49 Neb. 353; Wheatley v.
Glover, I25 Ga. 710.
59 Childs v. Cleaves, 95 Me. 498; Howarth v. Lombard, 175 Mass. 570;
Howarth v. Angle, 162 N. Y. '79; Love v. Pusey, 3 Penn. 577; Wyman v.
Kimberly-Clarke Co.i 93 Wis. 554, 559; Russell v. Pacific Railway Co., 13
Cal. 258; Finney v. Guy, 189 U. S. 335.
0o Guerney v. Moore, 131 Mo. 65o, 673. See Childs v. Cleaves, 95 Me.
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is growing in judicial and popular favor, the non-existence of the
principle in any state is scant reason for refusing to enforce a
contract on proper occasion against one of its citizens who has
made such a contract in another state.
Another difficulty has sometimes been experienced by re-
ceivers. If the law prescribing the liability of stockholders also
prescribes the remedy, then, it has been said, as the home remedy
cannot be enforced in the foreign state, the receiver has no stand-
ing in its courts.6' Wherever the doctrine has been held in this
rigid form, it has meant a denial of justice to creditors and a
complete shield to foreign stockholders, for they were not likely
to visit intentionally the home state where the specific remedy
could be enforced for the purpose of submitting to its tribunals.
"It certainly concerns the due administration of justice," remarks
Chief Justice Field, "that all stockholders, wherever they reside,
should be compelled by proceedings somewhere to perform the
statutory obligations towards creditors of the corporation which
they have assumed by becoming stockholders." 6 2  How, then,
have the courts dealt with this matter? In at least three ways.
If the law creating the stockholder's obligation has prescribed no
remedy, then the foreign state has applied its own remedy, and
compelled the stockholder living there to fulfil his obligation."3
In the second class of cases the courts, 'regarding the liability
of stockholders as essentially contractual and not statutory, have
enforced it without regard to the remedy prescribed by the home
power. This is the modem view which prevails almost every-
where.61 Rather than cut one off from redress where the foreign
remedy "is the only means of enforcing an undoubted right."
contended Chief Justice Ewing, sixty years ago, in the modern
61 See Howarth v. Angle, t62 N. Y. 379, i88; Barnes v. Wheaton, 8o Hun.
8; Nimick v. Mingo Iron Works, 25 W. Va. 184; Hancock National Bank v.
Ellis, 372 Mass. 39 and cases cited; Finney.v. Guy, o6 Wis. 256; Abbott
v. Goodall, ioo Me. 231; Middletown National Bank v. Toledo and North-
ern Michigan ?., 197 U. S. 394 and cases cited.
62 Hancock National Bank v. Ellis, I72 Mass. 39, 47; Childs v. Cleaves,
95 Me. 498, 516; Bell v. Farwell, 176 Ill. 489.
63 Russell v. Pacific Railway Co., I13 Cal. 258, 261.
64 Howarth v. Angle, 762 N. Y. 179; Howarth v. Lombard, 175 Mass.
570; Broadway National Bank v. Baker, 176 Mass. 294; Cushing v. Perot,
175 Pa. 66; Wilson v. Book, 13 Wash. 511; Childs v. Cleaves, 95 Me. 498;
Pulsifer v. Greene, 96 Me. 438, 445, 446; Love v. Pusey, 3 Penn. 577;
Lanigan v. North, 69 Ark. 62; Kirtley v. Holmes, 3O7 Fed. x. See Whit-
man v. Oxford National Bank, 176 U. S. 559.
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spirit, "the principle of comity ought to be so far extended as to
Oermit him to use the foreign remedy."6  And Justice Vann of
the New York Court of Appeals, recently, while asserting the
existence of the distinction above mentioned, reasoned as though,
for the higher end of justice, it ought to be disregarded. "It is
not necessary," said the Justice, "that the procedure to enforce
the liability in question should be that required by statute in this
state in the case of domestic corporations, as that would frequently
be impossible and would withhold the rights of comity altogether.
It is sufficient if the method of procedure in our courts is such
that no injustice is done to the stockholder who is sued, or to any
citizen of this state, and the established policy of the state is not
interfered with." 66
But not in every state. In one at least when the liability and
remedy are prescribed by the same statute, the remedy is still re-
garded as exclusive, which cannot be enforced in another state
where the foreign stockholder lives, thus enabling him by using
the thin theoretic veil of the law to escape from executing his
just obligation. This is the Wisconsin way of looking at the
matter 7 But not by all the members of its court of last resort.
In a recent decision, in which this exclusive remedy theory was
maintained, Justice Dodge, in a dissenting opinion, ringing with
sense and justice, declared that the decision destroyed a clear and
absolute right by denying any remedy for its enforcement, and
that, too, for no better reason than mere inconvenience to courts
in their procedure; an inconvenience, too, which seemed to him
"rather imaginary than real. This is a result which is not to the
credit of the courts," 68-- a conclusion which none, save the
reverential upholder of technicalties will question.
Albert S. Bolles
"
5Bank v. Trimble, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 599, 6o4, dissenting opinion.
66 Howarth v. Angle, 162 N. Y. 19o, i91.67 Finney v. Guy, io6 Wis. 277. See May v. Black, 17 Wis. ior review
of cases.
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